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“Creating” Rural Informality:  
The Case of Artisanal Gold 
Mining in Sub-Saharan Africa
Gavin Hilson
This paper offers a new perspective on the origin of informal artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM)—the low-tech, labor-intensive extraction and processing of mainly 
near-surface hard rock and alluvial gold deposits—in rural sub-Saharan Africa. It ar-
gues that the conditions that have fueled the sector’s recent rapid growth were brought 
about by policy changes made by host governments, multilateral organizations, and 
bilateral agencies. Over the past three decades, these actors have worked in partnership 
to promote industrial large-scale mineral exploration and excavation activity through 
increased foreign direct investment, and have simultaneously implemented regulatory 
frameworks for ASM industries. Previous scholarship has focused on the ASM sector’s 
sizable environmental footprint, including extensive land degradation and mercury 
pollution; the sector’s appalling health and safety record; and the many social ills com-
monly associated with communities where production takes place, such as prostitution 
and narcotics consumption. This paper will broaden understanding of the sector’s 
origins through a case study of Ghana’s informal mining economy.
The terms “informal sector” and “informal economy,” along with allied 
concepts such as the “underground economy” and “shadow economy,” were 
initially used as classifications for the collection of trades and services that 
had surfaced outside of taxation systems and broader regulatory frameworks 
in cities. The emphasis on urban areas is reflected in the earliest literature . . . 
on the informal economy focused on the towns and cities of Africa.1 Keith 
Hart’s typology of urban income opportunities was conceived from work 
conducted in Northern Ghana, where it was observed that the local Frafra 
people migrate to Accra, the capital.2 Hart discovered that “the unskilled 
and illiterate majority of Frafra migrants” were drawn into the “low-income 
section of the labour force in Accra,”3 the dynamics of which were used to 
inform the design of the urban income opportunities typology. Most of the 
research that would be undertaken on the informal sector in sub-Saharan 
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Africa in the 1980s and 1990s followed a similar course, providing detailed 
insight on the characteristics of the low-income areas of the region’s larger 
cities. By comparison, the region’s rural economy, which also underwent 
rapid change and expansion over the same period, attracted very little 
scholarly attention.
One logical explanation for this oversight, and scholars’ fixation on 
urban informality in sub-Saharan Africa in general, was the increased “vis-
ibility” of the informal sector in cities during the 1980s and 1990s. In addi-
tion to attracting rural migrants searching for better opportunities, many 
of the region’s large urban centers would absorb a steady stream of people 
left unemployed following scores of factory closures, privatization of state-
owned enterprises, and dismantling of public sector bodies that took place 
under the auspices of structural adjustment programs (SAPs).4
In Ghana, for example, during the early years of adjustment, 80,000 
jobs were lost on the Cocoa Board and 45,000 civil servants were imme-
diately redeployed. In Tanzania, more than 50,000 civil servants were im-
mediately retrenched following implementation of its first SAP in 1986.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been the principal recipient of adjustment loans, 
receiving 162 of the 288 packages awarded by the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund before 1981. Investment lending intensified in the 
1980s and 1990s, when thirty-seven countries in the region implemented a 
total of 162 SAPs (twenty-two countries are still engaged in such lending), 
thirty-six more than the number adopted elsewhere in the developing world 
over the same period. Overall, adjustment lending in sub-Saharan Africa 
now exceeds US$ 15 billion.6
With few job prospects, masses of unemployed converged on slums, 
where many not only found refuge but also thrived by engaging in a range of 
informal trades. Their immediate success was a result of quick recognition 
of the high demand for particular goods and services, which—as Sethuraman 
observed over three decades ago—“range from ready-to-eat foods to light 
industrial products, and from simple personal and household services to 
the repair of vehicles and consumer durables.”7 Consumer demand for these 
goods and services in urban African society has increased over the years. A 
second reason why changes in the region’s rural economy were overlooked 
was the sudden preoccupation with the “illegality” of the urban informal 
sector. Scores of analyses would emerge which pointed out that swelling 
urban informal economies were operating outside of regulations and there-
fore not paying taxes and royalties, the insinuation being that governments 
were losing significant revenues because these activities were unregistered.
During this period of protracted structural adjustment, rural sub-
Saharan Africa also experienced significant transformation, the most notable 
change being the growth of numerous informal sector activities. While some 
analysis of the region’s rural informal economy surfaced in the 1970s and 
1980s, scholars such as King fault this body of literature for “concentrat[ing] 
on the non-farm productive activities of rural dwellers rather than on sub-
sistence cash-crop agriculture.”8 The lack of focus on agriculture, however, 
was justifiable because under SAPs smallholder agriculture rapidly lost its 
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economic and trading position. Its diminished viability forced tens of thou-
sands of rural African families to turn to the non-farm economy for their 
incomes. Bryceson highlights why:
“SAP and economic liberalization policies resulted in a plethora of changes 
in rural productive and marketing infrastructure that often increased rather 
than reduced uncertainty. Many remote peasant farming areas experienced 
a decline in marketing services and the removal of subsidies on agricultural 
inputs, especially fertilizers, made the production of several peasant crops 
unviable…This environment induced a large-scale search for new, more re-
munerative activities outside agriculture.”9
With smallholder farming no longer able to stand on its own in many 
corners of rural sub-Saharan Africa, families have turned their sights to a 
series of informal non-farm activities for much-needed income. 
By far, the most important activity to grow under reform has been 
informal (unlicensed) artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM): low-tech 
mineral extraction and pro-
cessing. Over the past two 
decades, this largely poverty-
driven activity has expanded 
rapidly. Today, it provides 
employment to more than 
10 million Africans directly: 
at least one million people 
in Tanzania; another one 
million people in Ghana; 
and at least 200,000 women in Mali.10 The sector has also created several 
opportunities in the downstream industries it has spawned: the World 
Bank estimates that for every individual employed, six additional jobs are 
created in ancillary industries. Recent research shows that informal ASM 
has become a rooted and integral economic strand of numerous rural com-
munities across sub-Saharan Africa.11 
The revenues earned from ASM activities have put families in a posi-
tion to acquire crucial farm inputs to sustain their plots, pay their children’s 
school fees, and secure better quality housing. The importance of ASM in 
rural sub-Saharan Africa, however, has not been fully recognized by the 
donor and policymaking communities, whose elements continue to pro-
mote support for smallholder activity as the core solution to the region’s 
growing rural poverty problem,12 despite farming’s obvious limitations in 
generating sufficient disposable income for families in a liberalized mar-
ket. Moreover, most share an extremely negative opinion of informal ASM 
activity, condemning operators for not securing a license and evading the 
law. The significant environmental damage the sector has caused in many 
corners of the region, including widespread land degradation and mercury 
contamination, combined with prostitution and consumption of alcohol 
and narcotics that take place in so many mineral-producing communities, 
have further reinforced these views.13 Coverage of the sector’s negative at-
Recent  research shows that 
informal ASM has become a rooted 
and integral economic strand 
of numerous rural communities 
across sub-Saharan Africa.
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tributes has mobilized local and international media outlets, which have 
portrayed the growth of ASM activities as a problem and heavily influenced 
public perception.
This paper brings a new perspective to the debate on informal ASM 
in rural sub-Saharan Africa, arguing that the sector is the “creation” of 
donors and host governments. Most countries in the region have reformed 
their mining economies, implementing rigid regulatory frameworks in an 
attempt to catalyze growth. The stated intent has been to promote both 
foreign investment to develop large-scale projects and formalized ASM. But 
host governments and donors have prioritized the former, at the same time 
making it extremely difficult for individuals to secure the necessary paper-
work and licenses to participate in the latter. A case study of the “making” 
of Ghana’s informal gold mining economy is used to illustrate these points.
“Creating” Informality in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa:  
The Case of Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining
New literature on the informal sector provides context for how several non-
farm activities such as ASM have surfaced in remote areas. It examines the 
financial implications of informality, a discussion that applies to rural envi-
rons as well. Informal sector activities occur outside regulatory frameworks. 
As Mead and Morrison explain, “from the beginning, legality has been a 
central aspect of the concept,”14 the main debates centering on unregistered 
enterprises, non-payment of taxes, poor working conditions, and avoidance 
of a host of other institutional regulations.
By the turn of the century, the focus of the literature on urban 
informality had changed. The burgeoning body of scholarship produced in 
the 1980s and 1990s, which provided detailed insight on the composition 
of the sector and factors fueling its expansion in depressed regions of the 
world such as sub-Saharan Africa, had been shelved in favor of analysis that 
questioned the proliferation of 
urban informality. More scholars 
began to speculate on why those 
immersed in such work chose “not 
[to] comply with [the] legal or 
administrative requirements” of 
formalization.15 The view had long 
been that the pursuit of an informal 
sector existence was linked to a desire 
to avoid taxation and regulation. 
Schneider and Enste, for example, 
concluded in their global survey of 
the phenomenon that “an increasing 
burden of taxation and social 
security payments, combined with rising regulatory activities, are the major 
forces behind the size and growth of the shadow economy.”16 Dabla-Norris 
But there is  now broad 
agreement that many of those 
engaged in informal sector 
activities in urban stretches 
of the developing world are 
not necessarily doing so to 
avoid regulation, as was 
initially perceived.
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and Feltenstein corroborated this finding, arguing that “heavy tax burdens 
and excessive regulation imposed by governments that lack the capability 
to enforce compliance drives firms into the underground economy.”17 But 
there is now broad agreement that many of those engaged in informal sector 
activities in urban stretches of the developing world are not necessarily doing 
so to avoid regulation, as was initially perceived.
In fact, there is reason to believe that many aspire to be a part of formalized 
systems, a position which, as Joshi and Ayee explain, is shaped by two 
interrelated factors:
“First, the informal sector already pays significantly to stay in business but 
to corrupt public officials. Many would rather pay these sums legitimately to 
governments rather than [these individuals]…whose actions can be arbitrary 
and uncertain. Second it is also clear that contrary to popular belief, many 
within the informal sector are not in marginal occupations. They choose 
to remain informal not to avoid taxes, but rather because of other consid-
erations, such as the high transaction costs of being formal and the lack of 
accessible legal alternatives.”18
In many urbanized sections of sub-Saharan Africa, these barriers to entry, 
manifested as “[a] lack of access to development policies, in particular to 
[micro] credit programs, [vocational] training, and the marketplace,”19 can 
be quite significant. There have been numerous calls from the donor and 
NGO communities for governments to reduce tax burdens and to simplify 
regulatory systems to encourage formalization, a position which Sepulveda and 
Syrett refer to as the “legalist deterrent-centred” school.20 Advocates believe 
that by fixing these regulatory imperfections, those operating informally 
would be encouraged to enter the formal economy.
Although the circumstances and context are certainly different, 
when it comes to explaining the rapid expansion of the informal ASM sec-
tor—particularly, gold extraction and processing, which is by far its largest 
branch—that has occurred 
in rural sub-Saharan Africa 
over the past two decades, 
the narrative is very similar. 
Much like its burgeoning 
urban informal trades, the 
region’s informal artisanal 
gold mining economy has 
absorbed millions of rural 
farm families no longer able 
to subsist off of their crops 
alone. As explained, the dis-
mantling of support ser-
vices, removal of subsidies 
on crucial farm inputs such as fertilizers, and the stiff competition posed 
by multinational firms in a liberalized agricultural market have fueled a 
The typical ASM community in 
sub-Saharan Africa is therefore 
made up of a highly eclectic group, 
and is one of few settings in the 
region where illiterate farmers 
can be found working alongside 
former schoolteachers or public 
sector workers.
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frantic search for viable non-agricultural income-earning alternatives in 
rural sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, while the vast majority of people found in the region’s arti-
sanal gold mining communities are indeed farmers, a significant contingent 
originates from urban areas—mainly people made redundant following the 
implementation of SAPs. The typical ASM community in sub-Saharan Africa 
is therefore made up of a highly eclectic group, and is one of few settings in 
the region where illiterate farmers can be found working alongside former 
schoolteachers or public sector workers.21 Tax burdens and bureaucratic 
regulations have also fueled the rapid growth of the region’s informal gold 
mining sector. But unlike its urban informal economy, there are few sym-
pathizers—or a virtually non-existent “legalist deterrent-centered” school—
when it comes to explaining the growth of such gold mining activity.
The key difference between the informal urban economy and the unli-
censed artisanal gold mining sector in sub-Saharan Africa is that while the 
former is a product of a mixture of sweeping policy changes, the latter is 
more of an intentional construct on the part of policymakers and donors. 
The deliberate development of the artisanal gold mining sector, however, 
has been lost amid burgeoning discussion about the sector’s adverse social 
and environmental impacts. In the 1980s, alongside ambitious SAPs, many 
floundering economies in sub-Saharan Africa committed to reforming their 
mineral economies. Under the guidance of the World Bank, the governments 
of countries such as Ghana, Tanzania, Guinea, and Mali overhauled mining 
legislation, implementing a series of fiscal incentives that would attract con-
siderable investment in large-scale gold exploration and mining. The World 
Bank-prescribed blueprints for mining sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa 
are contained in its landmark document, “A Strategy for African Mining,” 
published in 1992.22 
During the initial years of mining sector reform, however, few of the 
region’s small-scale miners had managed to secure licenses and legitimize 
themselves in the eyes of new laws. But rather than attempting to under-
stand why this was the case, most of the early studies and policy analyses 
of ASM highlighted the importance of new regulations, casting them in a 
positive light while simultaneously condemning individuals who chose to 
continue submitting to an informal sector existence. This view was expressed 
at the February 1993 UN-hosted international seminar, “Guidelines for 
Development of Small- and Medium-Scale Mining” in Harare, Zimbabwe, 
which attracted more than 150 delegates from thirty countries. As Labonne 
explains, “participants agreed that small- and medium-scale mining made 
an important contribution to national and regional rural economies, and 
that in order to realize its full potential, this sector, which is amenable to 
some upscaling, should be supported and better regulated.”23
Many attendees would subsequently formulate even stronger views. 
One of the more vocal critics was Noetstaller, who argued that the “unli-
censed and unrecorded conduct of business is the rule rather than the ex-
ception,” and that “an indispensable initial step in replacing [this] informal 
wildcat mining is the legalization of the activity through recording and 
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licensing.”24 Early on in donor and policymaking circles, there seemed to 
be very little recognition that the growth of informal gold mining in rural 
sub-Saharan Africa was, in fact, a product of wider lifestyle changes that had 
engulfed the region.
The shortsighted ap-
proach to ASM regulariza-
tion, and its gold extraction 
and processing activities in 
particular, in sub-Saharan 
Africa is fairly reminiscent of 
most efforts made to align 
informal economies within 
newly implemented sector-
specific regulatory frame-
works.  Policymakers and 
donors have long failed to 
recognize that “most property in the informal sector cannot be documented 
and permanently inserted into the legal and global market economy by 
traditional titling, registration, surveying, mapping, and privatization ap-
proaches.”25 In a report published by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in 1999, it was argued that the policy treatment of ASM in sub-Saha-
ran Africa was problematic—specifically that the sector was being viewed as 
a subset within large-scale mining.26 Although experts conceded at the time 
that both segments of the industry were very different, (a notion perhaps 
best captured by Noestaller’s “Small- vs. Large-Scale Mining Comparative 
Profiles”27) for the most part all activities would be regulated by the same 
collection of laws. A survey of twenty-six countries undertaken by Bugnosen 
confirmed that this was indeed the case, concluding that across the develop-
ing world and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, “the information available 
shows that small-scale mining legislation is usually introduced as part of 
the provisions of the general mining laws of a country.”28
There seemed to be so little appreciation for the livelihoods dimen-
sion of the region’s informal gold mining economy that discussions rapidly 
turned to examine the possibility of its operators working as pathfinders for 
its rapidly expanding large-scale sector, kick-starting industrial complexes 
and potentially nourishing their growth.29 Time, however, would reveal how 
inappropriate such suggestions were and underscore even further the poor 
level of policy treatment ASM was receiving. Many working in the sector 
were disgruntled skilled and semi-skilled workers who were the victims of 
the region’s large-scale mining sector reform exercise, during which scores 
of state-owned operations were privatized and tens of thousands of people 
made jobless. These individuals would likely have scoffed at the idea of col-
laborating with their former employers.
The aim of “A Strategy for African Mining” was to establish two vi-
brant and regulated branches of mining—mainly gold—which could coexist 
and function side by side: a foreign-financed, large-scale sector on the one 
hand, and an indigenous, small-scale economy on the other.30 The problem, 
Early on in donor and policymaking 
circles, there seemed to be very 
little recognition that the growth 
of informal gold mining in rural 
sub-Saharan Africa was, in fact, a 
product of wider lifestyle changes 
that had engulfed the region.
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however, was that implementation was very poor, casting doubts about 
the true intentions of mining sector reform. Research has confirmed that 
throughout the region, under reform, priority has been given to developing 
large-scale gold mining and mineral exploration activities. In Uganda, for 
example, by the end of 2000, there were 221 outstanding exploration licenses 
(136 Exclusive Prospecting Licenses, 95 Location Licenses, and 15 Mining 
Leases), more than four times the number of licenses in 1990.31 In Tanzania, 
mining companies are granted areas as large as 150 square kilometers for 
reconnaissance and prospecting.32 From 1990 to 2001, Africa’s global share 
of mining investment increased from 12 to 28 percent, due in large part to 
overhauled legislation and taxation policies.33
Attention only turns to formalizing ASM once large-scale mining has 
been established (or re-established), by which time very little land is available 
for titling. A shortage of land for registered operators, in combination with 
the industry being “bedevilled with too many regulations that are mostly 
designed to constrain it and too few inspectors to ensure that they do,”34 
has discouraged individuals from securing the requisite permits, in effect 
“creating” the conditions conducive to the growth of the region’s informal 
gold mining. Policymakers and donors failed to heed initial commentary 
made by experts such as Davidson, who mused that “without reasonable 
opportunities to mine, artisanal miners will feel compelled to disregard 
the law and pre-existing rights in order to secure their own livelihoods, 
even in countries where artisanal mining has been legalized,” which means 
that “governments must be prepared to move beyond the establishment of 
legal frameworks to identify deposits and areas amendable to small-scale 
development.”35 The result has been the emergence of two branches of ASM, 
analogous to the dichotomized “firm-centered” and “bazaar-type” economies 
now prevalent in urban centers of the developing world: formalized activity 
and informal (unlicensed) operations. 
Livelihoods within the ASM sector and the growth in the region’s 
rural economy were not fully recognized in policy until 1995 at the World 
Bank’s “International Roundtable on Informal Mining,” where the links 
between the sector’s growth and poverty were articulated by experts for the 
first time.36 Having built considerable momentum over the years, these ideas 
continue to resonate, although donors and host governments continue to 
fixate heavily on the negative attributes of informal gold mining throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, these actors fail to recognize how the 
sector is largely a product of their own decisions, and how the industry’s 
many problems are inevitable outcomes of its informal existence.
The Case of Ghana
Ghana is one of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa where an infor-
mal gold mining economy has been intentionally created. The first country 
in the region to reform its mining sector, Ghana has become the poster child 
for such change in the developing world. In an attempt to attract foreign 
investors, the government passed a revised mining act in 1986, The Minerals 
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and Mining Law (PNDCL 153), the outcome of numerous deliberations and 
policy amendments made shortly after the implementation of the country’s 
1983 Economic Recov-
ery Program backed by 
the World Bank and the 
IMF. These moves would 
help to stimulate a 700 
percent increase in gold 
production over the next 
two decades.37 They also 
helped to transform the 
country into one of world’s leading gold producers. The Ghana experience 
influenced heavily “A Strategy for African Mining,” in which it is portrayed 
as a success story.
A rapidly expanding informal gold mining economy also took root in 
the country during this period. Today, more than one million people are 
employed directly in the sector, working in a range of settings, including 
on mining companies’ concessions, in forest reserves, and along roadsides.38 
Views of informal gold mining, however, are very different from those of 
large-scale activity. Not one day passes without an international or domestic 
media channel condemning the activities of this sector’s operators, who are 
popularly referred to as galamsey miners.
Most media coverage has focused on the sector’s appalling environ-
mental record and numerous significant safety concerns, although recently 
attention has turned to the country’s traditional leaders and even politi-
cians, who are accused of financing illegal activities. They are also accused 
of encouraging participation from the Chinese, who have managed to enter 
communities under false pretenses, typically armed. Some of the more recent 
articles that convey these messages include: “Inusah Fuseini pledges to stop 
Chinese illegal miners,” “Tackling destruction of the environment caused by 
illegal mining,” and “National security clamps down on illegal small scale 
mining activities.”39
Ghana’s policymakers portray licensed small-scale gold mining very 
differently from galamsey activity. While praising the former, they generally 
view the latter very negatively and remain unreceptive to any sympathetic 
views. They regularly claim, often without any facts, that the sector’s main 
participants are armed robbers, rapists, and other societal outcasts, and have 
even resorted to using the media to pin unrelated criminal acts—petty theft, 
racketeering, and prostitution—on galamsey operators.40 The government has 
launched an assault on all fronts against galamsey activities, determined to 
tackle what its senior officials see as “a menace” and believe to be the main 
source of destruction to the country’s bodies of water.41
What these policymakers fail to recognize, however, is that the so-
called galamsey “menace” and its associated problems are largely their own 
doing. Following recommendations prescribed by multinational and bilat-
eral agencies, the Ghanaian government did not formalize ASM until a full 
three years after the implementation of the aforementioned Minerals and 
The first country in the region to 
reform its mining sector, Ghana has 
become the poster child for such 
change in the developing world.
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Mining Law of 1986. The sector was not fully legalized until the passing 
of the Small-Scale Gold Mining Law (PNDCL 218) in 1989. By this time, 
however, significant portions of land had already been demarcated to foreign 
multinational gold mining and mineral exploration companies, many of 
which were hundreds of square kilometers in size, a situation that persists to 
the present day. There are now more than 380 active large-scale mining and 
mineral exploration concessions in Ghana, and although estimates vary, it 
is believed that in combination these leases cover at least 25 percent of the 
country’s land area.42 This has made identifying viable plots for individuals 
who wish to become licensed small-scale gold miners exceedingly challenging. 
With so much mineralized land now in the hands of foreign multinationals, 
the process has deterred rather than encouraged individuals from formal-
izing their activities.
A more significant aspect of the “creating informality” equation con-
cerns the exceedingly bureaucratic process of obtaining a license. In line 
with views initially put forward by Davidson,43 and reinforced by the ILO,44 
and Hentschel, Hruschka, and Priester,45 the regulatory framework for 
small-scale gold mining in Ghana is excessively bureaucratic.46 A small-scale 
mining license—which lasts three to five years and can be renewed subject to 
government review and approval—covers an area of up to twenty-five acres. 
Only Ghanaian nationals aged eighteen years or older are eligible to apply 
for small-scale mining licenses. Applicants are required to first submit ten 
copies of a completed Small-Scale Mining Application Form. In addition, 
site plans of the area of interest must be forwarded to one of nine min-
ing district centers—each based in areas with high concentrations of ASM 
activity—under the control of the Minerals Commission, the government 
body responsible for mining policy and regulation. The public has been 
informed that these units are empowered to screen and appraise applica-
tions before forwarding them to the Minerals Commission’s head office in 
Accra. Applicants must also complete an environmental impact assessment 
implemented specifically for ASM, which, despite being little more than a 
checklist, further complicates the process. Only after the requisite fees are 
paid can the applicant proceed to take his or her documentation to the 
Minister responsible for mines.
The entire licensing process is both costly and cumbersome, which 
further discourages registration. The preparation of site plans by a profes-
sional can cost an applicant up to 1,000 Ghana cedis (GHS) or US$ 512.47 
A payment of GHS 100 (US$ 51) must also be made for the application 
form, as well as a GHS 250 (US$ 128) processing fee, a GHS 550 (US$ 282) 
“consideration” fee, GHS 750 (US$ 384) to the Environmental Protection 
Agency for the environmental impact assessment, and payment of a number 
of other fees, including stamp duty, court duties, and stool land registra-
tion. Applicants also end up paying an assortment of bribes and making 
several informal payments to various landowners, which can amount to 
tens of thousands of cedis. Although the government claims decisions on 
licenses are made in a matter of weeks, the entire process has been known 
to take several months and even years. In the town of Japa in the country’s 
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Western Region, for example, applicants have waited upwards of three years 
for a decision on an application for a license, delayed by the government’s 
flirtation with large-scale mining and mineral exploration interests. 
By making the licensing process extremely costly and complicated, the 
Ghanaian government has helped to “create” what the sector is today: a bur-
geoning informal gold mining 
economy. Much of the same 
is taking place in other early 
reformed mining economies 
in sub-Saharan Africa, such as 
Tanzania.48 The near-identical 
policy changes being made 
in the region’s most recent 
reformers, including Mozam-
bique and Uganda, promise to 
yield similar outcomes.
Conclusion
This paper has provided a new perspective on informal gold mining in 
rural sub-Saharan Africa. It has sought to refocus a debate that has largely 
highlighted the negative aspects of unlicensed activities: significant environ-
mental impacts, health and safety concerns, and numerous social ills. The 
paper does not challenge the severity of these impacts, but rather contests 
that a more productive exercise would be to act on the source of these prob-
lems—specifically, bureaucratic regulations and policies.
It has been argued that the informality now ubiquitous in the ASM 
sector in sub-Saharan Africa is a product of policy, the consequences of 
which were potentially not well considered. The Ghanaian case has illumi-
nated the nuances of sub-Saharan Africa’s mining sector reform, the dynam-
ics of which provide very little consideration for small-scale operators. The 
resulting informality is, therefore, the government’s “creation.”
If it is the intention of African governments to encourage formaliza-
tion in the ASM sector, then the “simple awarding of titles and licences and 
a need for making them transferable, renewable and long-lasting are the 
bedrock of viable legal small-scale mining activity.”49 A necessary starting 
point is to put this important sector of industry at the heart of development 
efforts. This requires adopting a more bottom-up approach to formaliza-
tion. Siegel50 highlighted the merits of using de Soto’s approach,51 which 
drew attention to the benefits of studying the dynamics of informal mining 
activities, and applying this information to policy design. De Soto’s argu-
ment was based on what unfolded during the 1840s gold rush in the United 
States. As Siegel explains, in the absence of a government, miners formed 
hundreds of “extralegal” local and regional claim associations with elabo-
rate regulations for marking territories, which would eventually inform the 
country’s Mining Act, passed in 1872.
The informal gold-mining communities found across sub-Saharan 
Africa today are very organized and complex. Regulations that are in greater 
By making the licensing process 
extremely costly and complicated, 
the Ghanaian government has 
helped to “create” what the 
sector is today: a burgeoning 
informal gold mining economy.
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tune with the demands of the individuals employed in the sector could, 
therefore, go a long way toward making the vision of “A Strategy for African 
Mining” a reality: a vibrant industrial large-scale mining community on the 
one hand, and a formalized ASM economy on the other. Officers at the ILO 
have repeatedly argued that “if small-scale mining is to be encouraged to 
operate legally, legislation must be (at least) even-handed in allowing small-
scale miners access to suitable land for prospecting and mining activities.”52 
But as the case of Ghana has shown, this has proved elusive in sub-Saharan 
Africa thus far, largely because of the prevailing policy mindset.
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